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I. Introduction
The study of the fallacies has changed 
considerably in the forty years since Charles 
+DPEOLQUDLOHGDJDLQVWWKHVKRUWFRPLQJVRI
the so-called Standard Treatment of these 
DUJXPHQWVLQORJLFWH[WERRNV7KXV+DPEOLQ
SZULWHV
$QGZKDWZH¿QGLQPRVWFDVHV,WKLQN
it should be admitted, is as debased, 
worn-out and dogmatic a treatment 
as could be imagined – incredibly 
tradition-bound, yet lacking in logic 
and historical sense alike, and almost 
without connection to anything else in 
modern logic at all. This is the part of 
his book in which a writer throws away 
logic and keeps his reader’s attention, 
if at all, only by retailing traditional 
puns, anecdotes, and witless examples 
of his forbears. 
:KHUHSKLORVRSKLFDOUHÀHFWLRQRQWKH
IDOODFLHVEHIRUH+DPEOLQ¶VSRZHUIXOFULWLTXH
ZDVEDVHGXSRQDUWL¿FLDOO\FRQVWUXFWHG
examples which bore little or no resemblance 
to the types of arguments that are found in 
HYHU\GD\UHDVRQLQJWKHSRVW+DPEOLQHUDLQ
fallacy analysis has witnessed an increase in 
research which places emphasis on the types 
of arguments that people actually employ. 
Examples of fallacious arguments are now 
much more likely to come from sources 
such as newspapers, magazines, and other 
media outlets than they are to originate in 
the misguided attempts of fallacy theorists to 
FRQVWUXFWSODXVLEOHEXWDUWL¿FLDODUJXPHQWV
To see that this is the case, one need only 
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fallacious arguments from actual sources are 
in abundance. Examples include a discussion 
of ad hominem argument based on an article in 
the National PostDSSHDOVWRDXWKRULW\
using an article featured in Newsweek
and the argument from popularity based on a 
televised interview with a politician during the 
Canadian Broadcasting Company programme 
This Week in Parliament
The move to more naturalistic data 
for examination by fallacy theorists has 
XQGRXEWHGO\KDGEHQH¿WVIRUWKHWKHRUHWLFDO
frameworks of the fallacies that have 
emerged. The increased authenticity of these 
frameworks is a direct consequence of efforts 
to engage with people’s actual reasoning. One 
aspect of this improved authenticity is the 
development of new criteria for the evaluation 
of arguments. Arguments are now as likely to 
be characterised as fallacious if they violate 
discussion rules in a dialogue or conversation 
as they are if they fall short of some deductive 
standard of validity or soundness. This new 
emphasis on people’s actual reasoning is 
part of a wider pragmatic turn in the study of 
IDOODFLHVDWXUQLQZKLFKDVSHFWVRIFRQWH[WD
QRWLRQGHVSLVHGE\HDUOLHUWKHRULVWVPXVWEH
considered in any assessment of an argument. 
The arguer and his or her motivations for 
producing an argument is an integral part of 
context. The person who produces and receives 
arguments, it seems, has never before been so 
important to the study of the fallacies. 
One example of this pragmatic turn is 
the pragma-dialectical framework of Frans van 
(HPHUHQDQG5RE*URRWHQGRUVW
7KLVIUDPHZRUNGUDZVRQVSHHFKDFW
theory and other insights of Grice and Searle 
in developing an account of argumentation. 
Speech acts that violate one of the rules 
for a critical discussion and undermine 
attempts to resolve a difference of opinion are 
FKDUDFWHUL]HGDVIDOODFLHV³$Q\LQIULQJHPHQW
of one or more of the rules, whichever party 
commits it and at whatever stage in the 
discussion, is a possible threat to the resolution 
of a difference of opinion and must therefore 
be regarded as an incorrect discussion move. 
In the pragma-dialectic approach, fallacies are 
analyzed as such incorrect discussion moves 
in which a discussion rule has been violated” 
YDQ(HPHUHQDQG*URRWHQGRUVWS
)RUIXUWKHUGLVFXVVLRQRISUDJPDGLDOHFWLFV
VHH&XPPLQJVD
But appearances can be deceptive. 
Notwithstanding the emphasis on the role 
of the arguer in reasoning and on examining 
DFWXDODUJXPHQWVDVRSSRVHGWRDUWL¿FLDOO\
constructed arguments, there is a very real 
sense in which fallacy theorists are still failing 
to engage with actual reasoners. Almost 
nothing is known about the cognitive and 
other psychological processes that people use 
to assess that group of fallacious arguments 
DERXWZKLFK+DPEOLQKDGPRVWWRVD\WKH
informal fallacies. This should be compared 
to the extensive psychological literature that 
exists on deductive reasoning and fallacies 
and the equally large literature that exists on 
induction and errors of probabilistic reasoning. 
For example, a prominent psychologist of 
GHGXFWLRQ3KLOLS-RKQVRQ/DLUGKDVSURSRVHG
a mental models theory to account for people’s 
SHUIRUPDQFHLQFOXGLQJIDOODFLHVLQGHGXFWLYH
UHDVRQLQJWDVNVVHH-RKQVRQ/DLUGDQG%\UQH
IRUH[WHQVLYHGLVFXVVLRQ7KHZRUNRI
$PRV7YHUVN\DQG'DQLHO.DKQHPDQ
ZDVPRVWQRWDEOHDPRQJWKH¿UVWLQYHVWLJDWRUV
to study the types of errors subjects committed 
GXULQJSUREDELOLVWLFUHDVRQLQJ6HH
Kahneman’s 2011 engaging account of their 
research in Thinking, Fast and Slow.)
In contrast, no one has subjected 
the informal fallacies to experimental 
investigation, even though similar studies 
of other areas of logic have yielded useful 
results about the logical processes that people 
¿QGUDWLRQDOO\FRPSHOOLQJ7KHUHDUHYDULRXV
reasons for this omission. Chief amongst them 
is an aversion to psychologism in logic.  I 
concur with the stance on psychologism taken 
E\*DEED\DQG:RRGVWRDSSHDULQWKHLU
HPSLULFDOO\VHQVLWLYHORJLF³,QYHVWLJDWRUV
who make room for context and agency are 
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drawn to a form of what used to be called the 
Laws of Thought approach and, accordingly, 
are committed to an element of psychologism 
in logic. . . . Psychologism is once again an 
open question in the research programme of 
logical theory. Its re-emergence should not 
be prejudged. Better to wait and see how, 
once it is up and running, a psychologically 
real, agent-based logic fares as a theory of 
reasoning” LWDOLFVLQRULJLQDO.
Indeed the very fact that other branches 
of logic have survived the approaches of 
SV\FKRORJ\DQGQRWMXVWVXUYLYHGWKHVH
DSSURDFKHVEXWSRVLWLYHO\EHQH¿WHGIURP
WKHPVKRXOGUHDVVXUHIDOODF\WKHRULVWVWKDW
their particular corner of logic can only be 
enhanced by input from psychological studies 
of the informal fallacies. At least this is my 
starting point for the discussion in the current 
paper. The arguments investigated in this study 
– circular argument and analogical argument – 
have been extensively discussed in the fallacy 
and argumentation literature. But no one has 
previously attempted to elicit responses from 
subjects concerning the conditions under 
which these arguments are judged to be more 
or less warranted. This paper undertakes to do 
just that in the context of a task that examines 
public health reasoning.
The choice of public health reasoning 
as a context in which to examine circular 
and analogical arguments is motivated by 
the following considerations. The central 
claim of this paper is that many informal 
fallacies function as cognitive heuristics 
which can facilitate reasoning in contexts 
of uncertainty. The uncertainty in question 
may lie with scientists themselves, as when 
they are confronting an emerging infectious 
disease such as Severe Acute Respiratory 
6\QGURPH6$56RU%RYLQH6SRQJLIRUP
(QFHSKDORSDWK\%6(DQGWKHUHLVOLWWOHRUQR
knowledge of how the pathogens responsible 
for these diseases will behave. This lack 
of knowledge often extends beyond those 
scientists who are directly charged with 
responding to a public health problem to other 
medical professionals who provide advice on 
risk to the public. There is evidence that on the 
issue of BSE at least, medical professionals 
ODFNHGVXI¿FLHQWNQRZOHGJHWRJLYHDGYLFHWR
the public about the disease. Simpson et al. 
FRQGXFWHGDVXUYH\RINQRZOHGJHRI
BSE among 1,038 doctors in North Yorkshire, 
England. These investigators found that most 
GRFWRUVWKRXJKWWKDWWKHLUNQRZOHGJHRI
BSE was inadequate for them to give advice to 
the public.  
Alternatively, it may be a member of 
the public who is experiencing uncertainty, 
as when a person is attempting to assess 
WKHVLJQL¿FDQFHRIVRPHSXEOLFKHDOWKLVVXH
EXWODFNVWKHVFLHQWL¿FNQRZOHGJHWKDWLV
required to undertake such an assessment. 
In both scenarios, a lack of knowledge can 
be successfully bridged through circular 
and analogical reasoning. To the extent that 
these reasoning strategies permit scientists 
and lay reasoners to move beyond gaps in 
their knowledge and make decisions about 
public health issues, these strategies can 
be seen to serve as cognitive heuristics that 
facilitate reasoning in contexts of uncertainty. 
The heuristic value of these strategies for 
scientists addressing the emergence of BSE 
DQG+,9$,'6KDVEHHQGHVFULEHGLQYDULRXV
SXEOLFDWLRQVWRGDWH&XPPLQJV
2009, 2010b, 2011, 2012a-c, 2013a-b, 2014a-
HDE7KLVLVWKH¿UVWVWXG\WRH[DPLQH
how these same strategies are employed by lay 
reasoners, who must also cope with uncertainty 
in dealing with public health problems, 
albeit uncertainty that is generated through a 
UDWKHUOLPLWHGLQVRPHFDVHVQRQH[LVWHQW
NQRZOHGJHRIWKHVFLHQWL¿FLVVXHVLQYROYHG,W
LVH[SHFWHGWKDWWKHOD\UHDVRQHUZLOODOVR¿QG
these reasoning strategies to be a facilitative 
cognitive resource in the face of uncertainty.
II. Arguments as Cognitive Heuristics 
While the idea that certain fallacies 
can function as cognitive heuristics during 
reasoning about public health problems is 
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new, the place of heuristics in reasoning 
is actually well established. Reasoning 
KHXULVWLFVZHUH¿UVWV\VWHPDWLFDOO\VWXGLHG
E\$PRV7YHUVN\DQG'DQLHO.DKQHPDQ
,QWKHLUODQGPDUNDUWLFOH³-XGJPHQWXQGHU
8QFHUWDLQW\+HXULVWLFVDQG%LDVHV´7YHUVN\
DQG.DKQHPDQSGHVFULEHGD
number of heuristics that reasoners use in 
SUREDELOLVWLFUHDVRQLQJ³0DQ\GHFLVLRQVDUH
based on beliefs concerning the likelihood of 
uncertain events…people rely on a limited 
number of heuristic principles which reduce 
the complex tasks of assessing probabilities 
and predicting values to simpler judgmental 
operations.” Although Tversky and Kahneman 
acknowledged that heuristics could be 
useful, they were concerned to emphasise 
WKH³VHYHUHDQGV\VWHPDWLFHUURUV´WRZKLFK
heuristics could lead. For example, one such 
error is known as the gambler’s fallacy, the 
EHOLHIWKDWUDQGRPSURFHVVHVVHOIFRUUHFW³LI
[a random] sequence has strayed from the 
population proportion, a corrective bias in 
WKHRWKHUGLUHFWLRQLVH[SHFWHG´7YHUVN\DQG
.DKQHPDQS)RUDQH[WHQVLYH
and up-to-date account of their research 
SURJUDPVHH.DKQHPDQ
By the time heuristics began to receive 
sustained attention in the literature on risk, 
an altogether more benign view of these 
cognitive operations was beginning to take 
shape. The emphasis now was less on the 
errors in reasoning to which heuristics might 
lead and more on their facilitative function 
in dealing with complex problems. Some of 
these problems concerned issues of public 
KHDOWKVLJQL¿FDQFH7UXPERDQG
-RKQVRQGLVFXVVHGKHXULVWLFVLQWZR
studies that applied a heuristic-systematic 
model to the assessment of risk. These studies 
required subjects to assess risks that were 
communicated in epidemiological information 
DERXWFDQFHUUDWHV7UXPERDQGZKLFKZHUH
posed by a semi-hypothetical industrial facility 
-RKQVRQ-RKQVRQSVWDWHVWKDW
“[a]…heuristic-systematic model 
(HSM) separate[s] systematic from 
heuristic information processing. The 
systematic approach…is deliberative, 
attends to detail, weighs alternative 
views, and assesses argument quality 
in judging the validity of persuasive 
messages. The heuristic approach 
is alert to cues (e.g., trusted groups’ 
evaluation of the information) and 
simple decision rules (if encoded in 
memory, accessible to recall, and 
deemed reliable) justifying quick 
intuitive judgment.” 
:LOVRQHWDOH[DPLQHGKHXULVWLF
processing in a study of how adults assessed 
ULVNVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKJHQHWLFDOO\PRGL¿HGIRRG
crops.
So heuristics are not a new 
phenomenon in the study of reasoning or even 
the study of public health reasoning. But what 
is novel about the approach adopted in this 
paper is that no-one has previously attempted 
to cast certain informal fallacies in terms of 
cognitive heuristics that people employ when 
they form judgements about public health 
problems. Yet, there is much to recommend 
this approach. For those philosophers and 
logicians who have subjected the informal 
fallacies to serious scrutiny, the rewards 
have been plentiful. Quite apart from being 
examples of weak, bad, or shoddy reasoning, 
the informal fallacies have been found to be 
rationally warranted arguments within certain 
contexts of use. A sizeable literature now exists 
on non-fallacious variants of most of the major 
fallacies. The work of two fallacy theorists – 
'RXJODV:DOWRQDQG-RKQ:RRGV±KDVEHHQ
SDUWLFXODUO\LQÀXHQWLDOLQWKLVUHJDUG,QDODUJH
number of books and journal articles, these 
theorists have described non-fallacious forms 
of petitio principiiEHJJLQJWKHTXHVWLRQ
argumentum ad ignorantiamWKHDUJXPHQW
IURPLJQRUDQFHDQGargumentum ad baculum 
WKHDUJXPHQWIURPWKHVWLFNRUDSSHDOWR
IRUFHDPRQJVWRWKHUV:DOWRQ
:RRGV2IFRXUVHLQHPSKDVL]LQJ
that there exist non-fallacious variants of 
the fallacies, this is not the same as saying 
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that there are no such things as fallacies. For 
discussion of novel fallacious arguments in the 
context of the BSE problem, see Cummings 

An altogether smaller literature 
has sought to describe how these fallacies 
function non-fallaciously within the context 
RILPSRUWDQWSXEOLFKHDOWKLVVXHV&XPPLQJV
2002, 2004, 2009, 2010b, 2011, 2012a-c, 
DEDHDE:KDWWKHVHODWWHU
studies have revealed is that these argument 
forms can sustain reasoning in contexts 
that preclude other modes of reasoning, 
principally deduction and induction. These 
contexts exhibit pervasive uncertainty of the 
type commonly encountered at the outset of a 
VFLHQWL¿FLQTXLU\RUZKHQGHOLEHUDWLRQVH[FHHG
a reasoner’s available cognitive resources. In 
the sections to follow, we examine the features 
of two such heuristics, circular argument and 
DQDORJLFDODUJXPHQW7KH¿QGLQJVRIDVWXG\
that examines the conditions under which 
reasoners accept and reject these argument 
IRUPVDUHGHVFULEHG,QUHSRUWLQJ¿QGLQJV
from a psychological study of the fallacies, 
this study goes beyond the exclusively 
philosophical literature that exists on the 
informal fallacies.
II.A Circular Argument
Circular argument, also variously known as 
petitio principii, question-begging argument 
and circulus probandi, has long been a source 
of fascination for philosophers and logicians. 
This argument is a strange hybrid of deductive 
validity and epistemic unacceptability. An 
argument of the form ‘p, therefore p’ is 
none other than the principle of identity in 
IRUPDOORJLF:RRGVDQG:DOWRQS
GHVFULEHKRZ³>D@UJXPHQWVRIWKHIRUP
‘p, therefore p’ always or nearly always 
beg the question, yet their formal validity is 
LPSHFFDEO\UHÀHFWHGLQVWDQGDUG¿UVWRUGHU
ORJLF´3HUHOPDQSVWDWHVWKDW
³>W@KHDI¿UPDWLRQLISWKHQSVWDWLQJWKDWD
proposition implies itself, is not only true but 
is a fundamental logical law: it is the principle 
of identity.”  
+RZHYHUDSUHPLVHWKDWLVDV
unknown as the conclusion to be proved, 
which must be the case in any argument in 
which the premise and conclusion are one 
and the same proposition, cannot satisfy the 
epistemic requirement that the premise of 
an argument should be more certain than, 
or better known than, the conclusion to be 
SURYHG$FFRUGLQJWR%LURSWKH
problem with question-begging argument is 
WKDWLWLV³HSLVWHPLFDOO\QRQVHULRXV´ZKHUH
epistemic seriousness describes an argument 
in which the premises are more knowable than 
the conclusion. It is the perceived failure of 
circular argument to develop the grounds for 
a thesis that has seen this particular argument 
form almost universally condemned by 
WKHRULVWV)RU5HVFKHUSFLUFXODU
sequences in disputation must be blocked 
VLQFHWKH\³IUXVWUDWHWKHDLPRIWKH>GLDOHFWLFDO@
HQWHUSULVH´ZKLFKLV³WRGHHSHQWKHJURXQGLQJ
of the contentions at issue.” If the only ground 
that can be advanced in support of a thesis 
is the thesis itself, it is argued, then we have 
not established or proven a response to the 
TXHVWLRQDWLVVXHVRPXFKDVPHUHO\³EHJJHG´
for its acceptance. It seems that extensive 
philosophical preoccupation with circular or 
question-begging argument has produced few 
defenders of this argument form and even less 
to recommend it by way of rational merits. 
As question-begging argument began 
to be submitted to a more systematic treatment 
LQDSRVW+DPEOLQHUDRIIDOODF\DQDO\VLV
it soon became apparent to analysts that 
arguments with a distinctly circular form were 
not all inherently fallacious. Indeed, many 
VXFKDUJXPHQWVZHUHPHUHO\UHÀHFWLQJFHUWDLQ
QDWXUDOF\FOLFDOSURFHVVHVDWZRUNLQ¿HOGV
such as economics, mathematics, geology, 
SDODHRQWRORJ\DQGHYHQHSLVWHPRORJ\:DOWRQ
&XPPLQJV)RUH[DPSOHZLWK
UHJDUGHFRQRPLFV:DOWRQS
remarks that 
“in the majority of circular arguments 
40 INQUIRY: CRITICAL THINKING ACROSS THE DISCIPLINES
we looked at, the circularity 
cannot be condemned as wrong or 
fallacious precisely because the 
context of dialogue fails to indicate 
decisively that a priority condition 
is a procedural requirement. The 
economist’s argument we began with, 
for example, should not be declared 
fallacious or viciously circular by a 
reasonable critic unless the critic can 
cite evidence of an agreement, or at 
least a clearly agreed upon context or 
background requirement to argue only 
in one direction or the other…If the 
objective (the problem) is to prove from 
A to B, and also from B to A, there need 
be no fallacy in solving the problem by 
arguing in a circle.”
With regard to mathematical arguments, 
:DOWRQSDOORZVWKDW
“[i]n mathematics, it is common 
practice to start at proposition A and 
then prove B, then start again at B and 
prove that A follows. An equivalence 
proof in mathematics, of the if and only 
if type, often takes this form. Although 
the form of proof is circular, in many 
instances such a proof is rightly 
thought non-fallacious.”
The decisive factor in an evaluation 
of question-begging argument is now less 
the structure of these arguments than the 
SXUSRVHVIRUZKLFKWKH\ZHUHDGYDQFHG,I
that purpose included a requirement to argue 
from better known, or more established, 
propositions to less well known, or less 
established, propositions, then the circular 
structure of question-begging argument is 
FOHDUO\SUREOHPDWLF+RZHYHULIWKHUHLVQR
such requirement for evidential or epistemic 
priority in a particular context of argument, 
then an accusation of fallacy against the 
proponent of a circular argument is altogether 
OHVVWHQDEOH$WWKHRXWVHWRIVFLHQWL¿FLQTXLU\
particularly inquiry into a newly emerging 
infectious disease like BSE, there are few 
well-known, established theses at the disposal 
RILQYHVWLJDWRUV7RLQVLVWWKDWVFLHQWLVWVIXO¿OD
SULRULW\UHTXLUHPHQWDWWKLVVWDJHRIVFLHQWL¿F
inquiry is to misrepresent the epistemic 
standing of the propositions that are available 
to scientists in this context. A more sensible 
epistemic policy is to suspend this priority 
requirement until such times as a knowledge 
base of well-established propositions is 
available to investigators. In the interim 
period, it is quite legitimate for scientists to 
use a proposition as a premise in argument that 
is no better established than the conclusion to 
be proved.
,Q&XPPLQJVELWLVDUJXHG
that circular argument was used non-
fallaciously by scientists who sat on the 
Tyrrell Consultative Committee on Research 
during the BSE epidemic in the UK. The 
assumption of the question-at-issue in the 
deliberations of this committee permitted 
scientists to advance their investigations until 
such times as evidence that was independent 
of the conclusion to be proved could be 
obtained. Circular argument served as an 
effective and rationally warranted cognitive 
KHXULVWLFIRUVFLHQWL¿FLQYHVWLJDWRUVLQWKLV
context, a heuristic that enabled scientists to 
inch forward in inquiry at a time when little 
was known about BSE. Circular argument, it 
is argued, has a similar heuristic value for the 
lay reasoner who is attempting to assess the 
VLJQL¿FDQFHRISXEOLFKHDOWKSUREOHPVLQWKH
DEVHQFHRINQRZOHGJHRIWKHVFLHQWL¿FLVVXHV
involved. It is expected that lay reasoners 
will judge this argument to be rationally 
warranted under certain epistemic conditions 
and unwarranted under other conditions. 
Where this argument is seen to advance some 
type of inquiry – either a reasoner’s personal 
cognitive inquiry into an issue or the more 
formal inquiry of scientists into a problem – in 
the absence of evidence or knowledge relating 
to a topic, then this argument may be assessed 
by reasoners as being rationally warranted 
or as possessing some epistemic virtue. By 
implication, if evidence which is independent 
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of the conclusion to be proved is available to 
the reasoner, but the reasoner neglects to use 
it in favour of the question-at-issue, then it 
might reasonably be expected that this type 
of reasoning would be unfavourably assessed 
and judged to be lacking in rational warrant. 
The study described below in Section III will 
establish the conditions under which subjects 
are inclined to identify circles in reasoning as 
virtuous and vicious, respectively.
II.B Analogical Argument
A second fallacy that has attracted 
condemnation and praise in roughly equal 
measure from philosophers and logicians 
is the argument from analogy. One such 
FRQGHPQDWRU\YRLFHZDVWKDWRI-RKQ6WXDUW
Mill. Mill remarked as follows of analogy: 
³7KLVYHU\FRPPRQDEHUUDWLRQ>RYHUUDWLQJ
the probative force of analogy] is sometimes 
supposed to be particularly incident to persons 
GLVWLQJXLVKHGIRUWKHLULPDJLQDWLRQEXWLQ
reality it is the characteristic intellectual vice 
of those whose imaginations are barren…To 
such minds objects present themselves clothed 
LQEXWIHZSURSHUWLHVDQGDVWKHUHIRUHIHZ
analogies between one object and another 
occur to them, they almost invariably overrate 
WKHGHJUHHRILPSRUWDQFHRIWKRVHIHZ´
S
Analogical argument has been 
extensively discussed within different 
theoretical perspectives and disciplines. The 
interested reader should see Guarini et al. 
IRUDFRPSUHKHQVLYHRYHUYLHZRIWKHVH
SHUVSHFWLYHVDQGGLVFLSOLQHV.ODKU
SVWDWHVWKDW³LQWKHSDVWWZHQW\¿YH
years, analogy has assumed a central role in 
WKHRULHVRISUREOHPVROYLQJDQGVFLHQWL¿F
discovery and its underlying mechanisms 
have been studied in great detail.” At its most 
basic, however, the argument consists in an 
analogical premise that expresses a similarity 
or likeness between two entities A and B, and 
a second premise states that A has property 
P. From these two premises the reasoner 
then derives the conclusion that B also has 
SURSHUW\3$V%URZQSSXWVLW
³$QDORJ\LVRIWHQH[SODLQHGDVDVSHFLDONLQG
RIFRPSDULVRQRUVLPLODULW\EHWZHHQWZR
REMHFWVHYHQWVLGHDVFODVVHVRIREMHFWVHWF
such that the possession in common of one 
RUPRUHFKDUDFWHULVWLFSURSHUW\DWWULEXWH
HWFE\ERWKREMHFWVLVEHOLHYHGWRLPSO\WKDW
the two objects probably have some other 
FKDUDFWHULVWLFVLQFRPPRQ´
The following example of analogical 
argument is based on the reasoning of 
scientists in the UK during the BSE epidemic:
                    Scrapie in sheep and BSE in cattle  
         are similar in certain respects.
                    Scrapie is not transmissible to   
         humans.
                    Therefore, BSE will not be                        
         transmissible to humans.
This particular analogical argument was 
established on the basis of the most tentative 
ODUJHO\HSLGHPLRORJLFDOHYLGHQFH±
only strain-typing studies could establish 
GH¿QLWLYHO\LIVFUDSLHDQG%6(ZHUHUHODWHG
diseases and these studies were not available 
WRVFLHQWLVWVLQZKHQ%6(¿UVWHPHUJHG
in British cattle. The analogy established in the 
¿UVWSUHPLVHRIWKLVDUJXPHQWZDVWKHUHIRUHDW
EHVWZHDNO\ZDUUDQWHGKHQFHWKHVWDWXVRIWKLV
DUJXPHQWDVDZHDNDQDORJ\<HWDVLWZDV
DUJXHGLQ&XPPLQJVEWKLVSDUWLFXODU
argument served an important heuristic 
function for scientists who were confronted 
with the emergence of this new bovine disease. 
7KHDQDORJ\VHWLQSODFHDZHOOGH¿QHG
research agenda for scientists investigating 
BSE. Scrapie had been extensively studied 
by British scientists since the 1940s and all 
aspects of this disease – its genetic basis, 
histopathological features, transmission 
properties, etc. – were well documented and 
understood. By providing a template for how 
BSE might behave, the scrapie analogy set 
LQSODFHIRUVFLHQWLVWVDQXPEHURIVSHFL¿F
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research questions that could be usefully 
pursued. This facilitated the inquiry process 
at a time when there was considerable public 
concern about the risks that BSE posed to 
human health and scientists were under 
pressure to address these risks. Under these 
circumstances, even weak analogical argument 
was preferable to a scenario in which inquiry 
could not be initiated owing to a lack of 
knowledge.
Analogical argument, it is argued, 
has an equally facilitative role to play in 
the reasoning of the general public. Like 
professional scientists, lay reasoners must 
overcome uncertainty and lack of knowledge 
during their deliberations on a whole range 
RILVVXHVSXEOLFKHDOWKSUREOHPVVSHFL¿FDOO\
included. Where the scientist must address 
a lack of knowledge that is imposed on an 
LQTXLU\ZKHQDGLVHDVH¿UVWHPHUJHVRUZKHQ
certain ethical or technical restrictions limit 
the investigations that can be undertaken, 
the lay reasoner must contend with a lack 
of knowledge that is imposed on his or her 
reasoning by certain cognitive limitations 
HJOLPLWHGXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHVFLHQWL¿F
issues involved in a particular public health 
SUREOHP,WLVH[SHFWHGWKDWXQGHUWKHVH
conditions analogical argument will function 
as a productive resource, steering the reasoner 
in a direction that will most likely secure the 
attainment of his or her cognitive goals, which 
in this case is judgement about public health 
problems. The lay reasoner, it is hypothesised, 
will use analogical argument to arrive at 
judgements about issues that are beyond his 
or her cognitive grasp. The heuristic value of 
this particular reasoning strategy thus consists 
in its capacity to help the reasoner assimilate 
FRPSOH[VFLHQWL¿FLQIRUPDWLRQE\HVWDEOLVKLQJ
similarities with other, better understood 
phenomena. *OLNSFDSWXUHVWKLV
VDPHLGHDZKHQVKHVWDWHV³DQHZLOOQHVVWKDW
¿WVDQLQIHFWLRXVGLVHDVHSURWRW\SHZLOOEH
more easily understood or assimilated if a 
person already has a mental model of how an 
infectious disease is transmitted.” So, contrary 
WR-RKQ6WXDUW0LOODQGRWKHUGHWUDFWRUVRI
analogical argument, it is then predicted that 
lay reasoners will be competent judges of 
the conditions under which such a reasoning 
strategy is more or less rationally warranted. 
Indeed, this is one of the empirical theses 
that will be explored in the study described in 
Section III.
III. An Experimental Study of Two Informal 
Fallacies 
IIIA.  Rationale
This study is an experimental 
investigation of the informal fallacies, a 
branch of inquiry that has been the exclusive 
domain to date of logic and philosophy. It is 
WKH¿UVWDWWHPSWWRH[DPLQHKRZWKHSXEOLF
reasons using these argument forms in a public 
health context. The aim of this study is to 
establish the conditions under which subjects 
judge circular and analogical arguments to be 
rationally warranted during deliberation on 
public health problems. These problems are 
FKDUDFWHUL]HGE\DKLJKGHJUHHRIVFLHQWL¿F
knowledge which lay reasoners lack and which 
they are often unable to acquire on account of 
cognitive and educational limitations. Both 
argument forms are thus serving as cognitive 
heuristics that facilitate the public’s reasoning 
about these problems in the absence of 
knowledge. 
When one thinks of experimental 
investigations of reasoning, the work of 
cognitive psychologists such as Phillip 
-RKQVRQ/DLUGRQGHGXFWLYHUHDVRQLQJ
typically comes to mind. While this study 
shares certain features with this work – the 
presentation of stimulus material that tests if 
certain inferences have been drawn by subjects 
±LWDOVRGLIIHUVIURPWKLVZRUNLQVLJQL¿FDQW
ways. For example, studies of deductive 
reasoning present information in the form of 
premises in a structured argument to subjects, 
who are then required to draw a conclusion or 
judge the validity of a presented conclusion. 
In the current study, reasoning is examined 
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in a discursive context with subjects asked to 
justify their assessment of the reasoning of 
FHUWDLQVFLHQWL¿FDFWRUV7RWKLVH[WHQWWKLV
present study is more akin to the experimental 
UHDVRQLQJVWXGLHVRI'DYLG13HUNLQV
who has studied how subjects reason about 
everyday issues which are often polemical in 
nature, e.g. whether or not a military draft in 
the United States would increase American 
LQÀXHQFHLQWKHZRUOG6HH3HUNLQV
DQG3HUNLQVHWDO,WLVZRUWKQRWLQJ
WKDW)LQRFFKLDURSKDVUHPDUNHG
RI3HUNLQV¶VDSSURDFKWKDWLWLV³PXFKPRUH
valid than the usual experiments and provides 
the only effective experimental means of 
getting in touch and coming to grips with the 
phenomenon of reasoning.” 
It is hypothesized that subjects will 
judge circular argument to be most warranted 
under two conditions: 
ZKHQDSUREOHPLVFKDUDFWHUL]HGE\
pervasive uncertainty and investigators 
have no option but to proceed from 
premises in reasoning that are identical 
to, or dependent on, the conclusion to 
be proved, and 
ZKHQWKHDVVXPSWLRQRIWKH
conclusion to be proved helps 
investigators push forward in inquiry, 
i.e. when there is some perceived 
EHQH¿WIRULQYHVWLJDWRUVRIDVVXPLQJ
the question-at-issue. 
By implication, subjects will be less inclined 
to describe circular argument in positive 
evaluative terms if
HYLGHQFHUHODWLQJWRWKHTXHVWLRQ
at-issue is abundant but investigators 
choose to overlook this evidence 
in favour of conclusion-dependent 
evidence, or if 
VXEMHFWVSHUFHLYHWKDWWKH
assumption of the question-at-issue 
has not facilitated inquiry in that no 
progress has been made in terms of 
addressing a particular question or 
problem. 
It is predicted that subjects will identify 
circles as virtuous UDWLRQDOO\ZDUUDQWHG
XQGHUFRQGLWLRQVDQGDQGDVvicious 
UDWLRQDOO\XQZDUUDQWHGXQGHUFRQGLWLRQV
DQG
There are four public health scenarios 
that were used to examine circular argument: 
DDQHSLGHPLRORJLFDOLQYHVWLJDWLRQRIIHYHULQ
patients following vaccination for pneumonia, 
EDQLQYHVWLJDWLRQRIDGLVHDVHRXWEUHDNLQ
WKH&RQJRE\VFLHQWLVWVIURPWKH:RUOG+HDOWK
Organization, 
FDQLQYHVWLJDWLRQE\HQYLURQPHQWDO
epidemiologists of a purported link between 
electromagnetic radiation and birth defects and 
GWKHGLVFRYHU\RIDEL]DUUHGLVHDVHE\
medical anthropologists who are working in a 
remote region of Peru. 
The types of circular arguments investigated in 
the study are shown below:
9LUWXRXVFLUFOHSRVLWLYHRXWFRPH
SXEOLFKHDOWKVFHQDULRDDERYH
9LUWXRXVFLUFOHODFNRIHYLGHQFH
SXEOLFKHDOWKVFHQDULREDERYH
9LFLRXVFLUFOHQHJDWLYHRXWFRPH
SXEOLFKHDOWKVFHQDULRFDERYH
9LFLRXVFLUFOHDEXQGDQWHYLGHQFH
SXEOLFKHDOWKVFHQDULRGDERYH
It is also hypothesized that subjects will be 
competent judges of the conditions under 
which analogical arguments are more or less 
rationally warranted. Where an analogical 
premise is strongly warranted, for example, 
a similarity between two diseases such as 
+,9DQGKHSDWLWLV%LVHVWDEOLVKHGWKURXJK
epidemiological investigation, it is expected 
that subjects will be inclined to accept a 
conclusion in which the property of one 
disease is believed also to hold of the other 
disease. In this case, the conclusion is that 
+,9LVDEORRGERUQHYLUXVOLNHKHSDWLWLV%
Similarly, if an analogical premise is only 
weakly warranted such as occurred, for 
example, during the BSE epidemic when 
VFLHQWLVWVDUJXHGLQFRUUHFWO\WKDW%6(DQG
scrapie were related diseases, then we may 
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expect subjects to be disinclined to accept 
conclusions based upon this particular analogy. 
5HDVRQLQJLVLQÀXHQFHGWRDYHU\
large extent by the background knowledge 
that subjects bring to the problems they are 
assessing. It is expected that this background 
knowledge will affect the information that 
subjects attend to in the passages and the 
VLJQL¿FDQFHWKDWVXEMHFWVDWWDFKWRWKLV
LQIRUPDWLRQ$V.ODKUSUHPDUNV
³:KHQSHRSOHDUHUHDVRQLQJDERXWUHDOZRUOG
contexts, their prior knowledge imposes strong 
WKHRUHWLFDOELDVHV7KHVHELDVHVLQÀXHQFH
not only the initial strength with which 
hypotheses are held – and hence the amount 
RIGLVFRQ¿UPLQJHYLGHQFHQHFHVVDU\WRUHIXWH
them – but also the features in the evidence 
that will be attended to and encoded.”
To examine this effect in analogical 
reasoning, strong and weak analogies are 
portrayed in both actual and non-actual 
scenarios. The four public health scenarios that 
were used to examine analogical arguments are 
DWKHXVHRIKHSDWLWLV%E\WKH&HQWHUVIRU
'LVHDVH&RQWUROLQWKH86DVDPRGHOIRU+,9
$,'6KHDOWKDGYLFH
EDQLQYHVWLJDWLRQE\HQYLURQPHQWDO
epidemiologists of illness related to chemicals 
in drinking water, 
FWKHXVHRIVFUDSLHE\%ULWLVKVFLHQWLVWVWR
assess the risk of BSE to human health and 
GDVWXG\E\SKDUPDFRHSLGHPLRORJLVWVRIWKH
health effects of a new arthritis drug. 
The types of analogical arguments investigated 
in the study are shown below:
6WURQJDQDORJ\DFWXDOVFHQDULR
SXEOLFKHDOWKVFHQDULRDDERYH
6WURQJDQDORJ\QRQDFWXDOVFHQDULR
SXEOLFKHDOWKVFHQDULREDERYH
:HDNDQDORJ\DFWXDOVFHQDULR
SXEOLFKHDOWKVFHQDULRFDERYH
:HDNDQDORJ\QRQDFWXDOVFHQDULR
SXEOLFKHDOWKVFHQDULRGDERYH
IIIB. Method
This study is part of a wider 
investigation of the role in public health 
reasoning of four informal fallacies 
LJQRUDQFHDUJXPHQWDXWKRULW\DUJXPHQW
FLUFXODUDUJXPHQWDQGDQDORJLFDODUJXPHQW
&XPPLQJVEDEEXWRQO\WKHSDUW
of the study concerning circular argument and 
analogical argument is reported here. 
Circular Argument Example
Each subject was presented with eight 
public health scenarios in the form of a 
written, postal questionnaire. There were 
three different versions of the questionnaire 
and each respondent completed only one 
version. Scenarios examining the fallacies 
were randomly distributed across the three 
versions of the questionnaire. The scenarios 
consisted of a single paragraph of information 
following which were four questions. Two of 
the questions required either a yes/no response 
or a response of a few words and could be 
answered on the basis of information explicitly 
presented in the corresponding passage. These 
questions were intended to give respondents 
the impression that they were engaging in a 
reading comprehension task. A third question 
was intended to establish if subjects accepted 
a particular circular argument. Subjects were 
required to rate a particular circular sequence 
as being valid, moderately valid or not valid 
at all. A fourth question asked subjects to 
explain their answer to the question probing 
circular argument and was intended to elicit 
an open response from which information 
could be gleaned about the factors that had 
EHHQVLJQL¿FDQWLQWKHLQGLYLGXDOVXEMHFW¶V
reasoning. 
The following passage and questions 
examined a circular argument with the features 
<virtuous circle: lack of evidence>:
Circular Argument Scenario
6FLHQWLVWVDWWKH:RUOG+HDOWK
2UJDQL]DWLRQ:+2UHFHLYH
reports of a serious outbreak of 
illness in the Congo. The illness 
causes loss of appetite, intestinal 
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bleeding, severe breathing 
GLI¿FXOWLHVDQGDIDWDOSQHXPRQLD
Few people who develop the 
disease survive it. The symptoms 
DUHQRQVSHFL¿FDQGDUHD
feature of many diseases in the 
DUHD:+2¶VLQIHFWLRXVGLVHDVH
scientists make a preliminary 
assessment of the situation and 
tentatively claim that a virus 
EHORQJLQJWRWKH+DHPRVWULDWKXV
family may be responsible for 
WKHGLVHDVH:+2GLVSDWFKHVDQ
emergency team of virologists, 
parasitologists and epidemiologists 
to the region in order to establish if 
RQHRIWKH+DHPRVWULDWKXVYLUXVHV
is responsible for the disease. 
Apart from reports of symptoms, 
these scientists have no evidence 
upon which to initiate their 
investigation. They are unable to 
obtain case histories from most 
of the victims, a large number of 
whom are dead or too seriously 
ill to be questioned. The scientists 
are therefore unable to determine 
if the victims of the disease were 
near water sources that are known 
WRKDUERXU+DHPRVWULDWKXVYLUXVHV
In the absence of evidence, they 
DVVXPHWKDWD+DHPRVWULDWKXVYLUXV
is causing the disease and proceed 
to test the blood of hospitalised 
patients for the protein markers of 
these viruses.
Questions on Circular Argument Scenario
7KHHPHUJHQF\WHDPIURP:+2
assumedWKDWD+DHPRVWULDWKXVYLUXV
was the cause of the illness even as 
they were attempting to establish if this 
was the case. Please circle one answer 
to the following: was this strategy 
LYDOLG LLPRGHUDWHO\YDOLG 
LLLQRWYDOLGDWDOO"
3OHDVHH[SODLQ\RXUUHVSRQVHWR
:KHUHGLGWKHRXWEUHDNRILOOQHVV
occur?
:HUHSDUDVLWRORJLVWVSDUWRIWKH
HPHUJHQF\WHDPIURP:+2"
Analogical Argument Example
Analogical arguments were assessed 
using a similar format. As with circular 
arguments, four questions followed each 
passage. Two of these questions examined 
information presented in the passage and 
required either a yes/no response or a minimal 
response of just a few words. The question 
targeting the analogical argument in the 
SDVVDJHDVNHGVXEMHFWVWRUDWHDVFLHQWL¿F
response to a public health problem as valid, 
moderately valid or not valid at all. A fourth 
question asked subjects to explain their 
response to the question that probed analogical 
argument. The open-ended nature of the 
response was intended to reveal the types of 
IDFWRUVWRZKLFKVXEMHFWVDWWDFKHGVLJQL¿FDQFH
in rating an analogical argument. 
The following passage and questions 
examined an analogical argument with the 
features <strong analogy + actual scenario>:
Analogical Argument Scenario 
In 1981, reports of a rare form 
RISQHXPRQLDLQ¿YHSUHYLRXVO\
healthy homosexual males treated 
in three Los Angeles hospitals 
appeared in the Morbidity and 
Mortality Weekly Report in the 
United States. Little did the global 
VFLHQWL¿FFRPPXQLW\NQRZWKHQ
that it was witnessing early cases 
of what was to become known 
DV$,'6,QLWLDOO\WKH&HQWHUV
IRU'LVHDVH&RQWURO&'&GLG
not know what pathogen was 
responsible for this new disease. 
%HIRUHWKH+,9YLUXVZDVHYHQ
LGHQWL¿HGWKH&'&LVVXHGDGYLFH
on how the public could best 
SURWHFWLWVHOIDJDLQVW$,'67KLV
advice included information 
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about safe sex practices and the 
avoidance of needle sharing 
by intravenous drug users. The 
&'&¶VDGYLFHZDVEDVHGRQLWV
belief that the causal agent of 
$,'6PXVWEHDEORRGERUQH
virus given similarities between 
the population groups who were 
GHYHORSLQJ$,'6DQGWKRVHJURXSV
that were susceptible to another 
blood-borne virus, hepatitis B. 
These groups were homosexual 
males, intravenous drug users and 
recipients of blood transfusions. 
&'&VFLHQWLVWVKDGH[WHQVLYH
experience of the hepatitis B 
YLUXVE\WKHWLPHWKH¿UVWFDVHV
RI$,'6HPHUJHG&RQVHTXHQWO\
WKH\KDGOLWWOHGLI¿FXOW\DGDSWLQJ
public health information used 
for hepatitis B to address this new 
disease that confronted them.
Analogical Argument Questions
'LGWKH¿UVWFDVHVRI$,'6LQWKH86
appear in hospitals in San Francisco?
7KH&'&EHOLHYHGWKDW$,'6ZDV
caused by a blood-borne virus.  Please 
circle one answer to this question: 
:DVWKH&'&¶VEHOLHILYDOLGLL
PRGHUDWHO\YDOLGRULLLQRWYDOLGDWDOO"
,QZKLFKSRSXODWLRQJURXSZHUHWKH
¿UVW¿YHFDVHVRI$,'6GRFXPHQWHG"
3OHDVHH[SODLQ\RXUUHVSRQVHWR
All responses were written on the 
questionnaire which was completed 
anonymously. Subjects were informed that 
the task would take approximately 30 minutes 
to complete and that all data and responses 
ZHUHFRQ¿GHQWLDO7KH\ZHUHDGYLVHGWR
undertake the exercise in a distraction-free 
environment and not to consult sources 
such as books and the internet, as questions 
were intended to elicit judgements from 
subjects rather than correct answers. A 
deadline for return of the questionnaire was 
communicated to all subjects. At the outset 
of the study, all scenarios were examined 
by two public health consultants and two 
academic linguists. This was done with a view 
to establishing, respectively, the plausibility 
LQSXEOLFKHDOWKWHUPVRIWKHVFHQDULRV
and the comprehensibility of the linguistic 
constructions used to characterize them.
IIIC. Subjects
A total of 879 subjects participated in 
the study. All subjects were between 18 and 65 
years of age. Subjects could be male or female, 
of any ethnic or socioeconomic background 
and could be educated to either university level 
or secondary school level. The characteristics 
of all respondents to the questionnaire are 
shown in Table A in the Appendix. The three 
versions of the questionnaire received the 
VDPHQXPEHURIUHVSRQGHQWVYHUVLRQ$
VXEMHFWVYHUVLRQ%VXEMHFWVYHUVLRQ
&VXEMHFWV6XEMHFWVZHUHUHFUXLWHGWR
the study through a combination of methods. 
For the most part, the participation of subjects 
was secured through a series of formal 
recruitment activities which were undertaken 
in several venues, including public areas in 
local hospitals, staff dining facilities in large 
retail outlets and the lounge areas of private 
health clubs. A smaller number of subjects 
were recruited through a technique known 
as snowball sampling. In this technique, 
respondents to the questionnaire either 
offered to provide, or were asked to provide, 
the contact details of other individuals who 
might be willing to participate in the study. 
Questionnaires were subsequently sent to these 
individuals, some of whom recommended, 
in turn, other people who could participate 
in the investigation. Snowball sampling is 
a particularly effective way of recruiting 
subjects for a study when target groups are 
known to be inaccessible for a range of reasons 
%URZQH³$VDPSOLQJSURFHGXUH
PD\EHGH¿QHGDVVQRZEDOOVDPSOLQJZKHQ
the researcher accesses informants through 
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contact information that is provided by other informants. This process is, by necessity, repetitive: 
informants refer the researcher to other informants, who are contacted by the researcher and 
WKHQUHIHUKHURUKLPWR\HWRWKHULQIRUPDQWVDQGVRRQ+HQFHWKHHYROYLQJ³VQRZEDOO´HIIHFW
captured in a metaphor that touches on the central quality of this sampling procedure: its 
DFFXPXODWLYHGLDFKURQLFDQGG\QDPLFGLPHQVLRQ´1R\S
It was predicted at the outset of the study that secondary school educated males would 
be particularly unwilling to participate in an investigation of this type. Level of formal education 
is almost certainly a key factor in the poor engagement of secondary school males in this study. 
+RZHYHUDQRWKHUIDFWRULVOLNHO\WREHWKHWRSLFRIWKHVWXG\7KHUHLVHYLGHQFHWKDWELRORJLFDO
and health sciences are of less interest to men than the physical sciences. As a health-related 
GLVFLSOLQHSXEOLFKHDOWKVFLHQFHPD\VLPSO\QRWHQJDJHWKHLQWHUHVWRIPHQVXI¿FLHQWO\IRUWKHP
WRZDQWWRHQJDJHLQWKLVVWXG\6HHFKDSWHULQWKH6FLHQFHDQG(QJLQHHULQJ,QGLFDWRUV
1DWLRQDO6FLHQFH%RDUGIRUDGHWDLOHGGLVFXVVLRQRIWKHUROHRIIRUPDOHGXFDWLRQDQGVH[
LQERWKLQWHUHVWLQVFLHQFHDQGSHUIRUPDQFHLQVXUYH\VRIVFLHQWL¿FOLWHUDF\'HVSLWHFRQVLGHUDEOH
HIIRUWVWRUHFUXLWWKHVHVXEMHFWVWKH¿QDOUHFUXLWPHQW¿JXUHVUHYHDOHGWKDWVHFRQGDU\VFKRRO
educated males did indeed constitute an underrepresented group in the study: secondary school 
PDOHVVXEMHFWVVHFRQGDU\VFKRROIHPDOHVVXEMHFWVXQLYHUVLW\PDOHVVXEMHFWV
XQLYHUVLW\IHPDOHVVXEMHFWV
 
 
 
VIRTUOUS CIRCLE 
POSITIVE OUTCOME 
 
Results: 
 
Valid: 57.9%  
Moderately valid: 29.8%  
Not valid at all: 12.3%  
 
 
 
VIRTUOUS CIRCLE 
LACK OF EVIDENCE 
 
Results: 
 
Valid: 28.6% 
Moderately valid: 43.5% 
Not valid at all: 27.9%  
 
 
 
VICIOUS CIRCLE 
NEGATIVE OUTCOME 
 
Results: 
 
Valid: 31.1% 
Moderately valid: 25.6%  
Not valid at all: 43.3%  
 
 
 
VICIOUS CIRCLE 
ABUNDANT EVIDENCE 
 
Results: 
 
Valid: 10.6% 
Moderately valid: 29.5%  
Not valid at all: 59.9% 
 
 
TABLE 1: Circular argument 
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IIID. Results
Full results for circular argument and 
analogical argument are displayed in Tables 1 
and 2, respectively. Results for both types of 
argument are presented in this section.
$SRWHQWLDOO\VLJQL¿FDQWWUHQGZDVREVHUYHG
in the percentage of subject responses to the 
four passages examining circular arguments. 
There was a downward trend in the number 
of subjects who found circular argument to 
be a valid reasoning strategy as scientists 
increasingly overlooked evidence which 
was available to them. Subjects were most 
inclined to judge circular argument to be 
a valid reasoning strategy when it led to a 
SRVLWLYHRXWFRPHLQDVFLHQWL¿FLQYHVWLJDWLRQ
YDOLGDQGZHUHOHDVWLQFOLQHGWRMXGJH
it as valid when there was an abundance 
of conclusion-independent evidence which 
LQYHVWLJDWRUVIDLOHGWRXVHYDOLG
Between these extremes, subjects were almost 
equally inclined to judge the argument as 
valid when there was a lack of conclusion-
independent evidence available to investigators 
YDOLGDQGZKHQFLUFXODUUHDVRQLQJ
led to a negative outcome in an investigation 
YDOLG7KHUHZDVDQHYHQFOHDUHU
downward trend in the number of subjects who 
judged circular argument to be not valid at all 
as the evidence available to scientists lessened 
and as investigations were shown to result in a 
positive outcome. The percentage of subjects 
who judged circular argument to be not 
YDOLGDWDOOZDVDVIROORZVDEXQGDQW
HYLGHQFHDYDLODEOHWRLQYHVWLJDWRUV
QHJDWLYHRXWFRPHWRLQTXLU\ODFNRI
HYLGHQFHDYDLODEOHWRLQYHVWLJDWRUVDQG
SRVLWLYHRXWFRPHWRLQTXLU\
TABLE 2: Analogical arguments 
 
       ANALOGY 
 
 
 
SCENARIO 
 
 
STRONG 
 
 
 
WEAK 
 
 
 
 
      ACTUAL 
 
Strong analogy 
Actual scenario 
 
 
Results: 
Valid: 51.4%  
Moderately valid: 41.3%  
Not valid at all: 7.3% 
 
Weak analogy 
Actual scenario 
 
 
Results: 
Valid: 10.3% 
Moderately valid: 37.8%  
Not valid at all: 51.9%  
 
 
 
 
  NON-ACTUAL 
 
Strong analogy 
Non-actual scenario 
 
 
Results: 
Valid: 49.1%  
Moderately valid: 41.5% 
Not valid at all: 9.4% 
 
Weak analogy 
Non-actual scenario 
 
 
Results: 
Valid: 5.2% 
Moderately valid: 20.3% 
Not valid at all: 74.5% 
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'DWDZHUHDQDO\]HGXVLQJWKH6WDWLVWLFDO
3DFNDJHIRUWKH6RFLDO6FLHQFHV6366IRU
:LQGRZV9HUVLRQ:KHUHWKHUHZDV
no expectation of a difference between two 
YDULDEOHVWKLVZDVODUJHO\FRQ¿UPHGE\DODUJH
Pearson chi-square value. For example, it was 
predicted that subjects would judge the use of 
circular argument to be equally unacceptable 
ZKHQDVFLHQWL¿FLQYHVWLJDWLRQKDGDQHJDWLYH
outcome and when abundant evidence was 
available to investigators but was overlooked 
by them. It was expected that subjects would 
judge the occurrence of the argument under 
both of these epistemic conditions to be 
equally unacceptable, hence the original 
designation of these circular arguments as 
³YLFLRXVFLUFOHV´7KLVZDVFRQ¿UPHGE\D
large Pearson chi-square value of 31.756. This 
value exceeds 0.05, indicating that there was 
QRVWDWLVWLFDOO\VLJQL¿FDQWGLIIHUHQFHLQWKH
<negative outcome> and <abundant evidence> 
variables. 
It was also expected that subjects 
would judge circular argument to be equally 
YDOLGZKHQDVFLHQWL¿FLQYHVWLJDWLRQUHVXOWHGLQ
a positive outcome and when there was a lack 
RIHYLGHQFHDYDLODEOHWRLQYHVWLJDWRUVKHQFH
the designation of circular argument under 
ERWKHSLVWHPLFFRQGLWLRQVDV³YLUWXRXVFLUFOHV´
$JDLQWKLVZDVFRQ¿UPHGE\DFKLVTXDUH
value of 3.028, which exceeds 0.05, indicating 
WKDWWKHUHZDVQRVLJQL¿FDQWGLIIHUHQFHLQKRZ
subjects rated circular arguments under these 
HSLVWHPLFFRQGLWLRQV+RZHYHURWKHUQRQ
VLJQL¿FDQWFKLVTXDUHYDOXHVZHUHREWDLQHG
IRUSDVVDJHFRPSDULVRQVZKHUHDVLJQL¿FDQW
difference in subject responses might have 
been expected. They included comparisons 
between the epistemic conditions <positive 
RXWFRPH!DQGQHJDWLYHRXWFRPH!FKLVTXDUH
 EHWZHHQODFNRIHYLGHQFH!DQG
DEXQGDQWHYLGHQFH!FKLVTXDUH 
between <negative outcome> and <lack of 
HYLGHQFH!FKLVTXDUH DQGEHWZHHQ
<positive outcome> and <abundant evidence> 
FKLVTXDUH $SRVVLEOHH[SODQDWLRQRI
WKHVHQRQVLJQL¿FDQWUHVXOWVZLOOEHFRQVLGHUHG
in the discussion section.
7KHUHZDVDOVRDSRWHQWLDOO\VLJQL¿FDQW
trend in the responses of subjects to the 
passages that examined analogical argument. 
Strong analogies were consistently rated as 
more valid by subjects than weak analogies. 
This was evident across both actual and non-
actual scenarios. In this way, 51.4% of subjects 
rated a strong analogy as valid and only 10.3% 
rated a weak analogy as valid within an actual 
scenario. Within a non-actual scenario, a 
strong analogy was rated as valid by 49.1% 
of subjects and a weak analogy was rated as 
valid by 5.2% of subjects. The highest ratings 
RI³QRWYDOLGDWDOO´ZHUHFRQVLVWHQWO\IRXQGIRU
weak analogies across both actual and non-
actual scenarios. Weak analogies were rated 
DVQRWYDOLGDWDOOE\RIVXEMHFWVQRQ
DFWXDOVFHQDULRDQGRIVXEMHFWVDFWXDO
VFHQDULRZKLOHRQO\RIVXEMHFWVQRQ
DFWXDOVFHQDULRDQGRIVXEMHFWVDFWXDO
VFHQDULRUDWHGVWURQJDQDORJLHVDVQRWYDOLGDW
all. There appeared to be negligible percentage 
differences in subject ratings of validity across 
actual and non-actual scenarios. For example, 
responses to the passages which examine 
strong analogies were as follows: actual 
VFHQDULRYDOLGPRGHUDWHO\
YDOLGQRWYDOLGDWDOODQGQRQDFWXDO
VFHQDULRYDOLGPRGHUDWHO\
YDOLGQRWYDOLGDWDOO
As with circular argument, responses 
to the analogical argument passages underwent 
VWDWLVWLFDODQDO\VLV/DUJHDQGQRQVLJQL¿FDQW
FKLVTXDUHYDOXHVFRQ¿UPHGLQLWLDOLPSUHVVLRQV
of small and negligible percentage differences 
in subject responses to certain passages. For 
example, based on the above percentage 
¿JXUHVLWDSSHDUHGWKDWVXEMHFWVZHUH
largely insensitive to the <actual> and <non-
actual> variables in the context of passages 
that contained strong analogies. This was 
FRQ¿UPHGE\DFKLVTXDUHYDOXHRI
which exceeds 0.05, indicating that there 
ZDVLQGHHGQRVLJQL¿FDQWGLIIHUHQFHLQWKHVH
YDULDEOHV+RZHYHUZKHUHODUJHSHUFHQWDJH
differences in subjects’ responses occurred and 
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D¿QGLQJRIVLJQL¿FDQWGLIIHUHQFHPLJKWKDYH
been expected, this did not come about. For 
example, 51.4% and 10.3% rated analogical 
reasoning as valid in passages that contained 
strong and weak analogies, respectively. 
Yet, a Pearson chi-square value of 1.554 was 
obtained for these passages. An explanation 
RIWKHVHQRQVLJQL¿FDQWUHVXOWVLVJLYHQLQWKH
discussion section.
Statistical analysis of a subset of the 
data using the Pearson chi-square test indicated 
WKDWWKHUHZHUHQRVLJQL¿FDQWGLIIHUHQFHV
in reasoning based upon the gender and 
HGXFDWLRQOHYHORIUHVSRQGHQWV6HH7DEOH
%LQWKH$SSHQGL[7KLVFRQ¿UPVLQSDUW
WKH¿QGLQJVRIDQHDUOLHUVWXG\ZKLFKIDLOHG
WR¿QGDQHIIHFWRIDJHDQGJHQGHURQWKH
W\SHRILQIRUPDWLRQSURFHVVLQJV\VWHPDWLF
YHUVXVKHXULVWLFXVHGE\VXEMHFWVGXULQJWKHLU
assessment of epidemiological information 
DERXWFDQFHUUDWHV7UXPER*LYHQ
WKLVODFNRIVLJQL¿FDQWGLIIHUHQFHVDQG
the fact that subject attributes such as age, 
gender and education are not central to the 
questions posed by this study, it was decided 
not to conduct further statistical analysis of 
the effects of gender and education level on 
subjects’ reasoning.  
IV. Discussion
This study has revealed a previously untested 
rational competence on the part of lay 
people as they attempt to form judgements 
DERXWSXEOLFKHDOWKSUREOHPV,QWKLV¿UVW
experimental investigation of the informal 
fallacies, subjects were found to be adept at 
recognizing the epistemic conditions under 
which circles and analogies in reasoning 
were more and less rationally warranted. 
Subjects were able to identify when analogies 
DUHVXI¿FLHQWO\UREXVWWRSURYLGHVWURQJ
rational warrant for a particular public 
KHDOWKLQWHUYHQWLRQHJWKHGLVVHPLQDWLRQ
RISXEOLFKHDOWKLQIRUPDWLRQRQ+,9EDVHG
RQDQDQDORJ\ZLWKKHSDWLWLV%:KHUHDQ
DQDORJ\ZDVZHDNRUÀDZHGLQVRPHUHVSHFW
VXEMHFWVFRQVLVWHQWO\LGHQWL¿HGWKHVRXUFHRI
this weakness and rejected risk assessments 
and public health measures which were based 
XSRQLWHJWKHXVHRIDQDQDORJ\ZLWKVFUDSLH
LQULVNDVVHVVPHQWVDERXW%6(0RUHRYHU
these judgements were in evidence in actual 
and non-actual scenarios. This suggested 
that subjects’ judgements about public health 
problems are the manifestation of a stable 
UDWLRQDOFRPSHWHQFH6SHFL¿FDOO\WKH\DUHnot 
the consequence of the unique features that 
attend any particular public health problem.
%\WKHVDPHWRNHQVXEMHFWVLGHQWL¿HG
some circles in reasoning as valid, while other 
circles were considered to be dubious value 
and were accordingly rated as not valid at 
DOO9DOLGRU³YLUWXRXV´FLUFOHVLQUHDVRQLQJ
were those which enabled scientists to 
achieve a positive outcome in inquiry, where 
VXFKDQRXWFRPHPD\EHWKHFRQ¿UPDWLRQ
of a hypothesis about the cause of an illness 
in a population. Also, circles in reasoning 
were characterized as valid by subjects 
when scientists lacked evidence which was 
independent of the conclusion-to-be-proved. 
When either situation did not obtain, that is, 
when an inquiry either had a negative outcome 
or there was available evidence that was 
overlooked by scientists, subjects consistently 
judged these circles in reasoning to be not 
YDOLGDWDOOWKH\ZHUH³YLFLRXV´FLUFOHV
Furthermore, these judgements were 
not dependent on a particular public health 
problem or scenario – scenarios as wide-
ranging as the emergence of a new disease 
in a tribal population and the possible side 
effects of a vaccination for pneumonia were 
equally likely to give rise to these judgements. 
The consistency of these judgements across 
different scenarios once again suggests that 
subjects are drawing upon a stable rational 
competence in their reasoning.
This study provides tentative evidence 
for the claim that subjects are able to use 
analogical and circular arguments to bridge 
gaps in their knowledge during reasoning 
about complex public health problems. Both 
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analogical and circular arguments functioned 
for these subjects as quick rules of thumb or 
heuristics which guided judgement-making 
XQGHUVSHFL¿FHSLVWHPLFFRQGLWLRQV7KHVH
conditions were adverse in some respect with 
scientists attempting to assess public health 
risks and institute public health measures in 
WKHDEVHQFHRIHYLGHQFHDQGNQRZOHGJHRI
DQHZSDWKRJHQIRUH[DPSOH8QGHUWKHVH
conditions, circles and analogies were found 
to have a facilitative function in reasoning 
through their capacity to bridge gaps in 
subjects’ knowledge. Rather than suspend 
judgement in the absence of knowledge – an 
unwise cognitive policy in the public health 
domain where there are potentially serious 
consequences of inaction for human health – 
subjects put into effect reasoning strategies 
which helped them to arrive at judgement 
DERXWVRPHTXLWHFRPSOH[VFLHQWL¿FLVVXHV
Under more favourable epistemic conditions, 
it is likely that these strategies would be found 
wanting in a number of essential respects. 
+RZHYHUZKHQFRQIURQWHGZLWKHSLVWHPLF
uncertainty, subjects are clearly willing 
to embrace these traditionally fallacious 
arguments. 
A qualitative analysis of the extended 
responses of subjects to the passages in the 
questionnaire supports the claim that subjects 
are sensitive to the epistemic conditions under 
which analogies and circles in reasoning are 
more and less rationally warranted. Strong 
analogies elicited comments to the effect that 
VFLHQWLVWVZHUHGUDZLQJ³VFLHQWL¿FDOO\EDVHG´
connections between an existing and a new 
GLVHDVHDQGWKDWLWZDV³ORJLFDO´RU³DJRRG
starting point” to use existing knowledge in 
drawing conclusions about a new public health 
problem. The rational force of analogical 
reasoning was widely acknowledged by 
subjects to consist in the extent to which 
the chemicals and diseases described in the 
passages were similar in nature:
Strong analogies:
³7KH&'&>&HQWHUVIRU'LVHDVH&RQWURO@
QRWLFHGWKHVLPLODULWLHVEHWZHHQ$,'6
and hepatitis B and the population groups 
VXVFHSWLEOHWRERWKGLVHDVHV´:KLWHIHPDOH
\HDUVROGVHFRQGDU\VFKRROHGXFDWHG
³WKH&'&ZRXOGVHHPWRKDYHPDGHD
VFLHQWL¿FDOO\EDVHGFRQQHFWLRQEHWZHHQ
DQH[LVWLQJGLVHDVHDQGDQHZRQH´:KLWH
IHPDOH\HDUVROGXQLYHUVLW\HGXFDWHG
³,WKLQNLWZDVDJRRGVWDUWLQJSRLQWDVWKH
FKHPLFDOFRPSRXQGLQTXHVWLRQZDVLGHQWL¿HG
DVEHLQJVLPLODUWRWKHFKHPLFDOLGHQWL¿HGLQ
FDXVLQJWKHDLOPHQWVVWDWHG´%ODFN&DUULEHDQ
IHPDOH\HDUVROGXQLYHUVLW\HGXFDWHG
³,WVHHPVORJLFDOWRXVHH[LVWLQJNQRZOHGJH
about another similar chemical to investigate 
whether the second chemical was the source 
RIWKHKHDOWKSUREOHPVLQWKHDUHD´:KLWH
IHPDOH\HDUVROGXQLYHUVLW\HGXFDWHG
Subjects were equally adept at 
articulating their reasons for rejecting weak 
analogies. These reasons included comments 
WRWKHHIIHFWWKDW³UHODWHG´GLVHDVHVFRXOG
VWLOODFWGLIIHUHQWO\$VVXFKLWZDV³QRW
FRQFOXVLYH´DQGZDVQRWD³VDIHDVVXPSWLRQ´
to base a conclusion about the transmissibility 
RIRQHGLVHDVH%6(WRKXPDQVRQWKHODFN
RIWUDQVPLVVLELOLW\RIDQRWKHUGLVHDVHVFUDSLH
to humans. Indeed, to do so was characterized 
DV³ÀDZHGUHDVRQLQJ´$ODFNRIVLPLODULW\
EHWZHHQWZRGLVHDVHVDQGWZRFKHPLFDOVZDV
FOHDUO\LGHQWL¿HGE\VXEMHFWVDVFDVWLQJGRXEW
on the rational force of the weak analogies in 
the passages:
Weak analogies:
³7KH\EDVHGDQRSLQLRQDERXWDµQHZ¶GLVHDVH
on the action of a ‘different’ disease. This is 
QRWFRQFOXVLYH´:KLWHPDOH\HDUVROG
VHFRQGDU\VFKRROHGXFDWHG
³$WWKLVWLPHLWZDVQRWFRQFOXVLYHWKDW%6(
and scrapie were related diseases – it was only 
a suggestion, therefore the reasoning behind 
the suggestion that BSE would not transmit to 
KXPDQVZDVÀDZHG´:KLWHIHPDOH\HDUV
ROGXQLYHUVLW\HGXFDWHG
³LWGRHVQ¶WVHHPWRPHDVDIHDVVXPSWLRQ
that because two diseases are ‘related’ they 
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will necessarily act in the same way as far as 
WUDQVPLVVLRQWRKXPDQVLVFRQFHUQHG´:KLWH
PDOH\HDUVROGXQLYHUVLW\HGXFDWHG
³7KHGUXJVKDGGLIIHUHQWFKHPLFDO
compositions and therefore may not have 
been similar enough to draw that conclusion” 
:KLWHIHPDOH\HDUVROGXQLYHUVLW\
HGXFDWHG
In relation to circular arguments, an 
equally rich array of expressions was used 
by subjects to justify their judgements about 
the reasoning in the passages. Virtuous or 
valid circles were described in terms of good 
VFLHQWL¿FPHWKRGVXFKDVZKHQWKHRXWFRPH
RIDQLQTXLU\SURYLGHGFRQ¿UPDWLRQRID
VFLHQWL¿FK\SRWKHVLV9LUWXRXVFLUFOHVZHUH
DOVRFKDUDFWHUL]HGDVDW\SHRI³EHWWHUWKDQ
QRWKLQJ´UHDVRQLQJZKHQVFLHQWLVWVKDG³QR
real option” other than to use conclusion-
dependent evidence in order to advance 
an investigation. In both cases, practical 
considerations such as the time taken to 
conduct investigations and the urgency of 
DSXEOLFKHDOWKSUREOHPKLJKOLJKWHGLQWKH
RFFXUUHQFHRIGHDWKVIRUH[DPSOHZHUH
seen to justify reasoning which, under other 
circumstances, might not be judged in such 
IDYRXUDEOHHSLVWHPLFWHUPV1LFKRODV5HVFKHU
has discussed faute de mieuxIRUODFNRI
DQ\WKLQJEHWWHUFRQVLGHUDWLRQVLQFRJQLWLRQ
DQGUHDVRQLQJ6HH5HVFKHUIRUDQ
DFFRXQWRISUHVXPSWLRQLQWKLVFRQWH[W
Virtuous circles:
³$OOVFLHQFHLVEDVHGRQDQDVVXPSWLRQZKLFK
is then used to determine testable hypothesis 
which can be used to prove or disprove the 
DVVXPSWLRQ´:KLWHPDOH\HDUVROG
XQLYHUVLW\HGXFDWHG
³,W¶VWKHPRVWREYLRXVH[SODQDWLRQDQGOHQGV
LWVHOIWRHDV\TXLFNYHUL¿FDWLRQ7LPHZDV
REYLRXVO\RIWKHHVVHQFHLQWKLVFDVH´:KLWH
PDOH\HDUVROGXQLYHUVLW\HGXFDWHG
³,QWKHVLWXDWLRQGHVFULEHGLHQRFOHDU
HYLGHQFHWKHVFLHQWLVWVKDYHQRUHDORSWLRQ
RWKHUWKDQWRVHWXSZKDWWRWKHLUMXGJPHQWRQ
the basis of their initial preliminary assessment 
RIWKHVLWXDWLRQZDVDUHDVRQDEOHK\SRWKHVLV
DQGWRWHVWLW´:KLWHPDOH\HDUVROG
XQLYHUVLW\HGXFDWHG
³7KH\KDGQRWKLQJHOVHWRJRZLWK7KH\KDG
to make the assumption to test the hypothesis” 
:KLWHPDOH\HDUVROGXQLYHUVLW\
HGXFDWHG
³7KHDVVXPSWLRQFRXOGOHDGWRRWKHUVEHLQJ
monitored closely to prevent further deaths” 
:KLWHIHPDOH\HDUVROGXQLYHUVLW\
HGXFDWHG
Passages which contained vicious 
circles elicited an equally wide-ranging set of 
evaluative comments from subjects. Vicious 
circles were described as examples of bad 
VFLHQFHRUSRRUVFLHQWL¿FPHWKRG6XEMHFWV
stated that these circles were problematic 
because scientists overlooked evidence and did 
not consider other possible causes of diseases. 
6RPHVXEMHFWVLGHQWL¿HGWKHUHDVRQLQJDVD
W\SHRI³FLUFXODULW\´WKHODWWHUWHUPXVHGLQ
DVWULFWO\SHMRUDWLYHVHQVH,WLVZRUWKQRWLQJ
that no subject in the study used the term 
³FLUFXODULW\´LQDSRVLWLYHHSLVWHPLFVHQVH
The standard meaning of this term appears to 
UHÀHFWLWVODUJHO\QHJDWLYHFKDUDFWHUL]DWLRQLQ
WUDGLWLRQDOORJLFDOOLWHUDWXUH
Vicious circles:
³EOLQNHUHGDSSURDFK«WKHVHSHRSOHZHUHWU\LQJ
to establish a cause, not exclude a particular 
RSWLRQ9HU\EDGVFLHQFH´:KLWHPDOH
\HDUVROGXQLYHUVLW\HGXFDWHG
³$VWKH\KDGSULRUDVVXPSWLRQVDERXWWKH
FDXVHRIWKHGLVHDVHWKLVPD\KDYHLQÀXHQFHG
their methodology and also biased their 
UHVXOWVDVWKH\PD\KDYHXQNQRZLQJO\¿WWKH
data to their assumptions to get the results 
WKH\H[SHFWHG´:KLWHIHPDOH\HDUVROG
XQLYHUVLW\HGXFDWHG
³$OOSRVVLEOHFDXVHVVKRXOGKDYHEHHQ
FRQVLGHUHGVD\JHQHWLFFKHPLFDO
FRQWDPLQDWLRQHWF´:KLWHPDOH\HDUV
ROGXQLYHUVLW\HGXFDWHG
³LWPD\KDYHSUHYHQWHGKDPSHUHGDQDGHTXDWH
VHDUFKIRUDQDOWHUQDWLYHFDXVH´:KLWHPDOH
\HDUVROGXQLYHUVLW\HGXFDWHG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³$VVXPSWLRQOHDGVWRDFLUFXODULW\ĺLILW¶V
ZKDW\RXH[SHFWWR¿QGDQGGLVUHJDUGDOO
other sources of evidence, it will be what is 
IRXQG´:KLWHIHPDOH\HDUVROGXQLYHUVLW\
HGXFDWHG
$OWKRXJKWKHSHUFHQWDJH¿JXUHV
obtained in this study suggest a number of 
clear trends in how subjects rated the analogies 
and circles in the passages, these were not 
VXSSRUWHGE\VLJQL¿FDQWFKLVTXDUHYDOXHV
7KHODFNRIVLJQL¿FDQWFKLVTXDUHYDOXHVLQ
this study may be attributed to a couple of 
factors. Firstly, public health studies that 
examine human judgements typically employ 
a sample in excess of 1,000 subjects. This 
study obtained responses from 879 subjects. 
'HVSLWHH[WHQVLYHHIIRUWVWRUHFUXLWPRUH
subjects, it was simply not possible to do so. 
Many subjects agreed to participate in the 
study, but did go on to complete and return 
the questionnaire. Some individuals reported 
that this was on account of the amount of 
time and degree of effort which was needed 
to complete the exercises. Other public 
health studies have tended to use shorter 
questionnaires in which subjects merely tick 
boxes or circle responses. Also, these studies 
RIWHQRIIHUVXEMHFWVD¿QDQFLDOLQGXFHPHQW
for their participation. This was simply not 
possible within the resource constraints of the 
current investigation. It is likely that with a 
larger number of subjects, several chi-square 
YDOXHVWKDWDSSURDFKHGVLJQL¿FDQFHZRXOG
KDYHIDOOHQEHORZWKHVLJQL¿FDQFHOHYHO
Secondly, the test format required subjects 
to indicate one response from the following 
SRVVLEOHUHVSRQVHVDYDOLGEPRGHUDWHO\
YDOLGFQRWYDOLGDWDOO,WLVSRVVLEOHWKDWWKH
use of three response categories weakened 
trends in the subjects’ responses in terms of the 
statistical analysis. A simpler test format that 
PDGHXVHRIMXVWWZRUHVSRQVHFDWHJRULHVYDOLG
DQGQRWYDOLGPD\KDYHUHVXOWHGLQVWDWLVWLFDOO\
VLJQL¿FDQWUHVXOWV&HUWDLQO\WKHVHIDFWRUV
could be addressed in any further study in the 
area.
An experimental study of this type 
must ultimately contribute to the development 
of theoretical frameworks that can be used 
to explain the heuristic reasoning processes 
at work in public health and other contexts. 
Certainly, the heuristic processing models 
WKDWLQIRUPHGWKHULVNDVVHVVPHQWVWXGLHVVHH
6HFWLRQ,,RI7UXPERDQG-RKQVRQ
VHHPSRZHUOHVVWRDFFRPPRGDWHWKH
VSHFL¿FHPSKDVLVRQLQIRUPDOIDOODFLHVDV
cognitive heuristics addressed in this paper. 
+RZHYHUUHFHQWZRUNE\'RXJODV:DOWRQ
is at least suggestive of what a theoretical 
account of fallacies-as-heuristics might look 
OLNH$FFRUGLQJWR:DOWRQPRVWRI
the informal fallacies are associated with an 
argumentation scheme and a corresponding 
parascheme. The argumentation scheme is part 
RIDQHZHULQHYROXWLRQDU\WHUPVFRJQLWLYH
system which operates in a controlled, 
conscious and slow manner. This scheme asks 
critical questions of arguments, questions 
which are likely to expose logical weaknesses, 
if such weaknesses exist. The parascheme is a 
shorter version of the argumentation scheme. It 
is part of an older cognitive system which uses 
fast and frugal heuristics to achieve solutions 
to problems. Some of these heuristics involve 
jumping to conclusions, a cognitive strategy 
that can work well enough on some occasions 
but results in errors on other occasions. 
Walton demonstrates this heuristic view of 
the fallacies in relation to the argument from 
H[SHUWRSLQLRQDUJXPHQWXPad verecundiam
The parascheme of this argument omits 
assumptions, exceptions and one ordinary 
premise that are integral to the corresponding 
argumentation scheme. By neglecting these 
aspects, which confer a slow, deliberative 
character on reasoning, an arguer can employ 
DIDVWKHXULVWLFWRWKHHIIHFW³LILW¶VDQH[SHUW
RSLQLRQGHIHUWRLW´:DOWRQS
:DOWRQ¶VDSSURDFKKDVFHUWDLQEHQH¿WV
for the view of fallacies presented in this 
paper. It achieves an important cognitive 
reorientation of the informal fallacies. This is a 
sine qua non of an account of the fallacies that 
construes them as cognitive heuristics which 
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have a facilitative function in public health 
reasoning. Notwithstanding its cognitive 
emphasis, Walton’s approach retains a strong 
normative character such that informal 
fallacies are evaluated against the need to 
consider assumptions and exceptions which 
are typically bypassed by their corresponding 
KHXULVWLFV³7RMXGJHZKHWKHUDQDOOHJHG
argument from ignorance is fallacious the 
heuristic has to be examined in relation to 
whether other assumptions and exceptions 
need to be taken into account that may be 
DFFHSWDEOHRUQRW´:DOWRQS
Yet, these merits of Walton’s approach must 
be considered alongside a couple of notable 
GLI¿FXOWLHV2QHRIWKHIDOODFLHVZHKDYH
examined in this paper, circular argument-
-also known as petitio principii or begging 
the question--is one of several fallacies 
ZKLFK:DOWRQSDGPLWV³GRQRW
DSSHDUWR¿WVSHFL¿FDUJXPHQWDWLRQVFKHPHV
RUEHQH¿WGLUHFWO\IURPVFKHPHVZKHQLW
comes to analyzing them.”  In contrast, false 
analogy is amenable to analysis in terms of 
argumentation schemes. Also, on the account 
of fallacies presented in this paper, heuristics 
are not a matter of bypassing critical questions 
ZKLFKDWWHQGDQDUJXPHQWDWLRQVFKHPHjOD
:DOWRQEXWUDWKHUWKH\DUHPHQWDOVKRUWFXWV
through a domain of expert knowledge which 
is beyond the cognitive grasp of the lay 
person. If anything, the results of this study 
suggest that people in fact do address, rather 
than bypass, critical questions when they 
engage in heuristic reasoning. It remains to be 
seen if Walton’s approach can accommodate 
GLI¿FXOWLHVRIWKLVW\SHDQGRQHRUWZRRWKHUV
GLVFXVVHGLQ&XPPLQJVD,QWKH
PHDQWLPHLWLVD¿UPEDVLVXSRQZKLFKWR
build a theoretical account of a heuristic-based 
approach to the fallacies.
Quite apart from the logical and 
theoretical lessons of this investigation, there 
are also lessons for public health practitioners 
from the current study. This study has shown 
that the informal fallacies are capable of 
doing some important cognitive work in the 
public health domain. Given that subjects are 
reasonably adept at recognizing the conditions 
under which circles and analogies in reasoning 
are more and less rationally warranted, public 
health practitioners should begin to exploit 
this valuable cognitive resource in their 
communications and interventions with the 
public. Public health communications with 
members of the public are frequently ignored, 
rejected or misunderstood. This results 
in poor compliance with a large range of 
measures which are designed to protect human 
health. Cases in point are the low uptake of 
YDFFLQDWLRQVHJPHDVOHVPXPSVUXEHOOD
005LQÀXHQ]DDQGWKHZLGHVSUHDGQHJOHFW
of measures which protect against the spread 
RILQIHFWLRXVGLVHDVHVHJVH[XDOO\WUDQVPLWWHG
LQIHFWLRQV7RWKHH[WHQWWKDWOD\SHRSOH
recognize the conditions under which circles 
and analogies in reasoning are more and less 
rationally warranted and are prepared to put 
this knowledge to use in making judgements 
about public health problems, it would seem 
eminently reasonable for practitioners in the 
SXEOLFKHDOWK¿HOGWRIUDPHPHVVDJHVDQG
advice with these cognitive strategies in mind.
Public health practitioners should also 
be aware of one further and very important 
OHVVRQIRUWKHLU¿HOGIURPWKHFXUUHQWVWXG\
That lesson is that a lack of knowledge is not 
the same as a lack of reasoning. Certainly, lay 
people do not have the knowledge of expert 
scientists in the public health domain and other 
VFLHQWL¿FDUHDV7KHUHLVQRGRXEWWKHUHIRUH
that they experience a lack of knowledge. But 
if this study demonstrates one thing it is that 
even lay people are capable of bringing to an 
assessment of public health problems a rich 
array of reasoning strategies which serve them 
well in arriving at judgements about those 
problems. It would be a serious mistake for 
public health practitioners to confuse a lack 
of knowledge on the part of lay people with a 
lack of reasoning and then proceed to construct 
public health communications and advice 
on this basis. The result would be a series of 
interventions which fail to engage with the 
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rational cognitive strategies of the very people 
– members of the public – whose compliance 
is most needed in order to undertake effective 
public health work. So, in conclusion, it 
can be said that public health practitioners 
should certainly exploit the informal fallacies 
examined in this study. But a policy of actively 
circumventing these arguments is guaranteed 
to lead only to poor compliance with protective 
health measures on the part of the public.  
V.  Summary
7KLVVWXG\LVSDUWRIWKH¿UVW
experimental investigation of a group of 
arguments called the informal fallacies in 
public health reasoning. These arguments 
have traditionally been examined by logicians 
and philosophers whose principal concern 
has been to describe their logical and 
epistemic features. The ability of lay people 
to recognize these features and employ these 
arguments as heuristics during reasoning 
about public health issues has not previously 
been considered by investigators. The study 
provides tentative evidence that lay subjects 
are adept at recognizing the conditions under 
which circular and analogical arguments are 
more and less rationally warranted. Moreover, 
they are capable of exercising this rational 
competence in order to arrive at judgements 
about complex public health problems. This 
¿QGLQJKDVLPSOLFDWLRQVIRUUHFHQWWKHRUHWLFDO
models of the informal fallacies as cognitive 
KHXULVWLFV+RZHYHUEH\RQGWKHORJLFDODQG
theoretical implications of the current study, 
there are also implications for public health 
practitioners. To the extent that members 
of the public possess this particular rational 
competence and can apply it to public health 
problems, practitioners in the public health 
¿HOGLWLVDUJXHGVKRXOGVHHNWRH[SORLWWKLV
competence in their communications with the 
public.  
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Appendix 
TABLE A: Subject characteristics 
 
  
          SUBJECT CHARACTERISTICS 
                     (total = 879 subjects)  
 
 
 
   AGE 
 
   Average: 43.8 years 
    
   Range: 18-65 years 
 
 
   GENDER 
 
   Male: 292 subjects 
 
   Female: 587 subjects 
 
 
EDUCATION 
    
 
   University level: 589 subjects 
 
   Secondary school level: 290 subjects 
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TABLE B: Argument type: sex and education level (university/secondary) 
 
 
 
             ARGUMENT TYPE 
 
    Response 
 
     Sex             Education 
 
     M/F 
 
   Uni/Sec 
Analogical argument: 
Strong analogy 
Actual scenario 
 
Valid: 
Moderately valid: 
Not valid at all: 
49.4/52.2% 
43.4/40.5% 
7.2/7.3% 
49.2/56.0% 
43.7/36.3% 
7.1/7.7% 
Analogical argument: 
Strong analogy 
Non-actual scenario 
 
Valid: 
Moderately valid: 
Not valid at all: 
40.4/49.7% 
48.2/42.3% 
11.4/8.0% 
44.2/49.0% 
45.8/42.9% 
10.0/8.1% 
Analogical argument: 
Weak analogy 
Actual scenario 
 
Valid: 
Moderately valid: 
Not valid at all: 
7.8/12.0% 
36.5/38.6% 
55.7/49.4% 
6.8/17.2% 
40.6/32.3% 
52.6/50.5% 
Analogical argument: 
Weak analogy 
Non-actual scenario 
 
Valid: 
Moderately valid: 
Not valid at all: 
8.6/3.6% 
19.4/20.8% 
72.0/75.6% 
4.1/7.4% 
21.0/18.9% 
74.9/73.7% 
Question-begging argument: 
Virtuous circle  
Positive outcome 
 
Valid: 
Moderately valid: 
Not valid at all: 
61.0/56.7% 
25.6/31.5% 
13.4/11.8% 
59.4/54.6% 
27.4/35.2% 
13.2/10.2% 
Question-begging argument: 
Virtuous circle  
Lack of evidence 
 
Valid: 
Moderately valid: 
Not valid at all: 
33.9/25.9% 
43.5/42.9% 
22.6/31.2% 
30.0/27.4% 
44.7/40.0% 
25.3/32.6% 
Question-begging argument:  
Vicious circle 
Negative outcome 
 
Valid: 
Moderately valid: 
Not valid at all: 
39.1/27.4% 
21.8/27.4% 
39.1/45.2% 
34.9/23.5% 
26.2/24.5% 
38.9/52.0% 
Question-begging argument:  
Vicious circle 
Abundant evidence 
Valid: 
Moderately valid: 
Not valid at all: 
10.9/10.5% 
29.3/29.5% 
59.8/60.0% 
12.3/7.2% 
27.2/34.0% 
60.5/58.8% 
 
